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Abstract
We show how probabilities can be treated as truth values in suit-
able sheaf topoi. The scheme developed in this paper is very general
and applies to both classical and quantum physics. On the quantum
side, the results are a natural extension of our existing work on a
topos approach to quantum theory. Earlier results on the represen-
tation of arbitrary quantum states are complemented with a purely
logical perspective.
“Fate laughs at probabilities.”
E.G. Bulwer-Lytton, from Eugene Aram (1832)
1 Introduction
In a long series of papers, we and our collaborators have shown how quantum
theory can be re-expressed as a type of ‘classical physics’ in the topos of
presheaves (i.e., set-valued contravariant functors) on the partially-ordered
set all commutative von Neumann sub-algebras of the algebra of all bounded
operators on the quantum-theory Hilbert space H [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10].
These ideas have been further developed by Caspers, Heunen, Landsman,
Spitters, and Wolters in a way that emphasises the internal structure of the
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1
topos [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Flori has presented a topos formulation of
consistent histories in [13].
The reformulation of quantum theory presented in these articles is a radi-
cal departure from the usual Hilbert space formalism. All aspects of quantum
theory—states and state space, physical quantities, the Born rule, etc.—find
a new mathematical representation, which also provides the possibility of
a novel conceptual understanding. In particular, an observer-independent,
non-instrumentalist interpretation becomes possible. For this reason, we call
the new formalism ‘neo-realist’.
Of course, many open questions remain. This article deals with aspects
of probability as it shows up in both classical and quantum physics. As we
will see, in both cases the usual probabilistic description can be absorbed
into the logical framework supplied by topos theory.1
The interpretation of probability theory has been discussed endlessly after
the Renaissance endorsed it as a respectable subject for study. In longevity,
the subject shares the peristalithic nature of debates about the conceptual
meaning of quantum theory. Every physicist even mildly interested in philo-
sophical questions will have heard about the range of different, incompatible
viewpoints about probability: frequentist vs. Bayesian vs. propensity; objec-
tive vs. subjective probabilities; classical vs. quantum probabilities; epistemic
(lack-of-knowledge) vs. irreducible probabilities; and a bewildering range of
combinations of those.
We cannot hope to solve this debate here, but some useful remarks cane
made from the viewpoint of physics. While most scientists lean naturally
towards the relative-frequency/frequentist view on probability, this interpre-
tation is limited because it cannot be used to assign a probability to the
outcome of a single experiment.2 By definition, the frequentist interpreta-
tion requires a large ensemble of similar systems on which an experiment is
performed, or a large number of repetitions of the experiment on a single
system.
A particular challenge is posed by those physical situations in which a fre-
quentist interpretation cannot apply, even in principle. For example, if the
whole universe is regarded as a single entity, as in cosmology, then clearly
there are no multiple copies of the system. Moreover, the instrumentalist
1As a side remark, we do not see quantum theory fundamentally as some kind of gen-
eralised probability theory. Such a viewpoint is almost invariably based on an operational
view of physics and, worse, usually comes with a very unclear ontology of both probabilities
themselves and the objects or processes to which they apply.
2It is always interesting to reflect on what a weather forecaster really means when he
or she says ”There is 80% chance of snow tomorrow”.
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concept of an ‘experiment’ performed on the entire universe is meaningless,
since there is no external observer or agent who could perform such an experi-
ment. This renders problematic both quantum cosmology and stochastic clas-
sical cosmology unless probabilities can be understood in non-instrumentalist
terms. This argument applies also to subsystems of the universe provided
they are sufficiently large and unique to make impossible the preparation of
an ensemble of similar systems, or repetitions of an experiment on the same
system.
Of course, in most of science there is a valid instrumentalist view in which
the world is divided into a system, or ensemble of systems, and an observer.
The system, or ensemble, shows probabilistic behaviour when an observer
performs experiments on it. In the ensuing two-level ontology the system
and the observer have very different conceptual status. Frequentist views
of probability typically lead to such a dualism. A Bayesian view, in which
probabilities are primarily states of knowledge or evidence, also presupposes
a divide between system and observer and is based on an operational way of
thinking about physical systems.
Such an operational view does not readily extend to quantum cosmol-
ogy.3 Hence, it is desirable to have a (more) realist formulation of quantum
theory—or, potentially, more general theories—that could apply meaning-
fully to the whole universe. This desire to avoid the two-level ontology of op-
erational/instrumentalist approaches is one of the motivations for the topos
approach to the formulation of physical theories.
In our previous work it was shown in detail how pure quantum states and
propositions are represented in the topos formalism and how truth values can
be assigned to all propositions, without any reference to observers, measure-
ments or other instrumentalist concepts. In fact, for pure quantum states,
probabilities are replaced by truth values which are given by the structure
of the topos itself. For the specific presheaf topoi used in our reformulation
of quantum theory, a truth value is a lower set in the set V(H) (which is
partially ordered under inclusion) of commutative subalgebras of the alge-
bra, B(H), of all bounded operators on H. We only consider non-trivial,
commutative von Neumann subalgebras V ⊂ B(H) that contain the identity
operator. Each V ∈ V(H) can be seen as providing a classical perspective on
the quantum system, with smaller commutative subalgebras giving a more
‘coarse-grained’ perspective than bigger ones.
A truth-value is therefore a collection of classical perspectives from which
3We are aware of many-worlds approaches and the attempts to (re)define probabilities
in such a formalism. However, we are not very enthusiastic about these schemes.
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a given proposition is true. The fact that a truth value is a lower set in V(H)
expresses the idea that once a proposition is ‘true from the classical perspec-
tive V ’, upon coarse-graining to smaller subalgebras V ′ ⊂ V , the proposition
should stay true. The elements4 V ∈ V(H) are also called contexts or, by
mathematicians, stages of truth. It is easy to see that there are uncountably
many possible truth values if dim(H) > 1 (compare this with the uncountably
many probabilities in the interval [0, 1].)
The treatment of pure states in the topos approach makes it unnecessary
to speak of probabilities in any fundamental way. However, at first sight
mixed states cannot be treated similarly. Since we aim at a formalism that
can be interpreted in a (neo-)realist way, it seems most appropriate to regard
probabilities as objective. More specifically, we lean towards an interpreta-
tion of probabilities as propensities. Since the probabilities associated with
pure quantum states are absorbed into the logical structure given by the
topos, we aspire to find a ‘logical reformulation’ for the probabilities associ-
ated with mixed states as well. As we will see, this necessitates an extension
of the topos used so far for quantum theory. Probabilities are thereby built
into the mathematical structures in an intrinsic manner. They are tied up
with the internal logic of the topos and do not show up as external entities
to be introduced when speaking about experiments.
We finally remark that all constructions shown here work for arbitrary von
Neumann algebras5 and arbitrary states, normal or non-normal. The more
general proofs need no extra effort, though interpretational subtleties relating
to non-normal states may arise. For simplicity and clarity of presentation,
we use here only B(H) as the algebra of physical quantities of a quantum
system and pure or mixed (i.e., normal) states.
2 The Topos Approach and Mixed States
2.1 Some basic definitions
There are several articles giving an introduction to the topos approach to
quantum theory [9, 10, 12] and only a few ingredients are sketched here. We
assume some familiarity with basic aspects of category and topos theory and
4Strictly speaking, V(H) is a category whose objects are the commutative sub-algebras
V . It is therefore more accurate to write V ∈ Ob(V(H)), rather than V ∈ V(H), and this
we did in our earlier papers. However, here, for the sake of simplicity, we use the latter
notation.
5For some results, the algebra must not have a type I2-summand.
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of functional analysis.
A key feature of the topos approach is the existence for each quantum
system of an object that is functionally analogous to the state space of a
classical system. This ‘quantum state space’, Σ, is a presheaf (i.e., a set-
valued, contravariant functor) on the poset V(H) of abelian subalgebras of
B(H), the algebra of physical quantities (or observables) of the quantum
system. The collection of all such functors is a topos, denoted SetsV(H)
op
.
The poset V(H) and object Σ are known respectively as the context category
and spectral presheaf.
Definition 2.1 The spectral presheaf, Σ, is defined over the context cate-
gory, V(H), as follows:
(i) On objects V ∈ V(H), ΣV is the Gel’fand spectrum of the commutative
von Neumann algebra V .
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ → V ( i.e., V ′ ⊆ V ), the presheaf functions
Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ are defined as
Σ(iV ′V )(λ) := λ|V ′ (2.1)
for λ ∈ ΣV . Here λ|V ′ denotes the restriction to V
′ of the spectral
element λ ∈ ΣV .
A sub-object (i.e., sub-presheaf) S is said to be clopen if SV is a clopen
set in ΣV for all V ∈ V(H). The clopen sub-objects of Σ form a complete
Heyting algebra (Theorem 2.5 in [6]), denoted Subcl(Σ).
Propositions in physics are usually of the form “Aε∆”, which in classical
physics would read “the physical quantity A has a value, and that value lies in
the (Borel) set ∆ ⊆ R of real numbers”. Using the spectral theorem for self-
adjoint operators, a proposition “Aε∆” is represented in quantum theory
by the spectral projector Eˆ[Aε∆]. It was shown in [6] that there is a map
δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ), called ‘daseinisation of projection operators’, which
sends each projection operator Pˆ to a clopen sub-object δ(Pˆ ). In this way,
a proposition “Aε∆” is represented by the clopen sub-object δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) of
Σ. This is analogous to classical physics where propositions are represented
by (measurable) subsets of the classical state space.
The sub-object δ(Pˆ ) is constructed in a two-step process. First, one
defines, for all V ∈ V(H),
δ(Pˆ )V :=
∧
{Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ  Pˆ}, (2.2)
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which gives the ‘best’ approximation to Pˆ from above by a projector in the
lattice, P(V ), of projection operators in the context V . The association
V 7→ δ(Pˆ )V is a global element, denoted δ(Pˆ ), of the outer presheaf O [1, 3]:
Definition 2.2 The outer presheaf, O, is defined as follows :
(i) On objects V ∈ V(H), OV := P(V ).
(ii) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , the mapping O(iV ′V ) : OV → OV ′ is
O(iV ′V )(Pˆ ) := δ(Pˆ )V ′ for all Pˆ ∈ P(V ).
The second step uses the existence of a monic arrow, ι : O → PclΣ, from
O to the clopen power object, PclΣ, of Σ [6]. This sub-object, PclΣ, of the
power object PΣ has the property that its global elements are clopen sub-
objects of Σ, whereas the global elements of PΣ are arbitrary sub-objects
[6]. The construction of ι exploits the fact that for any commutative von
Neumann algebra V , there is an isomorphism of complete Boolean algebras
αV : P(V ) = OV → Cl(ΣV ), (2.3)
Pˆ 7→ {λ ∈ ΣV | λ(Pˆ ) = 1}
between the projections in V and the clopen subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum,
ΣV , of V . Given a projection Pˆ ∈ P(V ), we define
SPˆ := αV (Pˆ ), (2.4)
and given a clopen subset S ⊆ ΣV , we define
PˆS := α
−1
V (S). (2.5)
Thus locally, i.e., in each context V , we can switch between clopen subsets
and projections.
Applying this to the family δ(Pˆ )V , V ∈ V(H), of projectors, gives a
family Sδ(Pˆ )V ⊆ ΣV , V ∈ V(H), of clopen subsets. This family of clopen
subsets forms a clopen sub-object, denoted δ(Pˆ ), of Σ. Equivalently, the
global element δ(Pˆ ) : 1 → O defined by (2.2) gives rise via ι : O → PclΣ to
a global element 1→ O → PclΣ of PclΣ, and hence to the clopen sub-object
δ(Pˆ ).
Given a (normalised) vector state |ψ〉, we now form
w
|ψ〉 := δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) ∈ Subcl(Σ). (2.6)
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This clopen sub-object is the topos representative of the pure state |ψ〉: we
call w |ψ〉 the pseudo-state associated with |ψ〉.
To each vector state |ψ〉 ∈ H and physical proposition “Aε∆” there
corresponds the ‘topos truth value’ ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
∈ ΓΩ defined at each stage
V ∈ V(H) as,
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′ |ψ〉 = 1}. (2.7)
We also write
ν
(
Pˆ ; |ψ〉
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (2.8)
for any projection operator Pˆ on H.
This truth value, which is a sieve on V , can be understood as the ‘degree’
to which the sub-object w |ψ〉 that represents the pure state is contained in the
sub-object δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) that represents the proposition. This degree is simply
the collection of all those contexts V ∈ V(H) such that w
|ψ〉
V ⊆ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V .
2.2 The problem of mixed states
A very interesting (and important) question is how mixed states should be
treated in this topos formalism. In its basic form, a mixed state is just a col-
lection of vectors and ‘weights’, { |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . , |ψN〉; r1, r2, . . . , rN}, where∑N
i=1 ri = 1 (we allow N = ∞). In standard quantum theory, the assump-
tion that the quantum probabilities are stochastically independent from the
‘weights’ r1, r2, . . . , rN , leads via elementary probability arguments to the
familiar definition of the associated density matrix as ρ :=
∑N
i=1 ri |ψi〉〈ψi|
and hence to the familiar expressions in which, for example, tr(ρAˆ) replaces
〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉.
The important challenge is to find an analogue for ρ of the truth value in
(2.7) for vector states |ψ〉, and in such a way that density matrices are
separated by this expression. Of course, the vector |ψ〉 in (2.7) can be
replaced with ρ to give the sieve on V
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | tr
(
ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′
)
= 1}, (2.9)
but this is not adequate for our needs as it does not separate density matrices.
For example, let H be a three-dimensional Hilbert space with a chosen
basis, and let ρ = diag(1
2
, 1
2
, 0) and ρ˜ = diag(3
4
, 1
4
, 0) be two density matrices
that are diagonal with respect to this basis. Then tr(ρPˆ ) = 1 if and only
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if tr(ρ˜Pˆ ) = 1 if and only if Pˆ  Pˆ1 + Pˆ2, where Pˆ1, Pˆ2 are the projections
onto the rays determined by the first two basis vectors. In other words, ρ
and ρ˜ have the same support, namely Pˆ1 + Pˆ2, and the topos truth value
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)
∈ ΓΩ (given by the family ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)
(V ), V ∈ V(H), of sieves
defined above) depends only on the supports, not on the actual weights, in
ρ and ρ˜.
As pointed out in [3], there exists a one-parameter family of valuations
defined for all V ∈ V(H) as
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | tr
(
ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′
)
≥ r} (2.10)
where r ∈ (0, 1]. (One could allow r = 0, but clearly, the condition then
is trivially fulfilled and the valuation ν(−;−)0 gives the truth value ‘totally
true’, represented by the maximal sieve at each stage, for all states ρ and
all propositions “Aε∆”.) The authors of [3] could find no use for these r-
modified ‘truth’ values. However, it transpires that this family of valuations
does separate density matrices, which is very suggestive of how to proceed.
Indeed, the main result of this paper is to show how the one-parameter
family in (2.10) can be regarded as a single valuation in a particular extension
of the topos SetsV(H)
op
. By this means we will achieve a completely topos-
internal description of arbitrary (normal) quantum states ρ.
At this point we remark that there is another topos perspective on density
matrices that at first sight appears to be very different from the one above.
One of us (AD) has shown how each density matrix, ρ, gives rise to a ‘prob-
ability’ (pre-)measure, µρ, on Subcl(Σ) [11]. This function µ
ρ : Subcl(Σ) →
Γ[0, 1] is defined at all stages V ∈ V(H) by
µρ(S)(V ) := tr(ρ PˆSV ) (2.11)
where PˆSV is the projection operator in P(V ) that corresponds to the com-
ponent SV of the clopen sub-object S at stage V . Here, [0, 1]
 denotes the
presheaf of [0, 1]-valued, nowhere-increasing functions on the poset/category
V(H). It can readily be checked that this family of measures separates den-
sity matrices.
Conversely, [0, 1]-valued probability measures on the spectral presheaf
Σ can be defined abstractly, with the clopen sub-objects playing the role of
measurable subsets. Provided the Hilbert space H has at least dimension
three, from each such measure, µ, one can construct a unique quantum state
ρ˜µ : B(H) → C, such that µρ˜
µ
= µ.6 The existence of such measures is
6For the more general case of von Neumann algebras treated in [11], the condition is
that the von Neumann algebra has no summand of type I2.
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in accord with our general slogan that “Quantum physics is equivalent to
classical physics in the topos SetsV(H)
op
”.
The construction in (2.11) can be applied to a (normalised) vector state
|ψ〉, to give
µ |ψ〉〈ψ| (S)(V ) := 〈ψ| PˆSV |ψ〉 (2.12)
at all stages V . In particular, for the sub-object SAε∆ of Σ associated with
the spectral projector Eˆ(Aε∆) we get
µ |ψ〉〈ψ| (SAε∆)(V ) = 〈ψ| δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V |ψ〉 (2.13)
Thus, for each state |ψ〉, a proposition “Aε∆” is associated with two,
quite different, mathematical entities:
(i) the Heyting-algebra valued topos truth value ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
∈ ΓΩ de-
fined in (2.7) as
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (2.14)
for all V ∈ V(H); and
(ii) the [0, 1]-valued measure µ |ψ〉〈ψ| on Subcl(Σ) defined in (2.13) as
µ |ψ〉〈ψ| (SAε∆)(V ) := 〈ψ| δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V |ψ〉 (2.15)
for all V ∈ V(H).
The purpose of the present paper is to study the relation between these
two entities, and thereby to see if there is a topos-logic representation of the
general, density-matrix measure, µρ in (2.11). Thus the challenge is to relate
the probability measure µρ : Subcl(Σ)→ Γ[0, 1]
 to a topos truth value and
hence to relate probability to intuitionistic logic. It is clear that the definition
in (2.9) is not adequate as, unlike the measures µρ, it fails to separate density
matrices.
As we shall see, the one-parameter family of valuations r 7→ ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
∈
ΓΩ defined in (2.10) plays a key role. However, the incorporation of this fam-
ily into a topos framework requires an extension of the original quantum topos
SetsV(H)
op
. We will motivate this by first considering a topos perspective on
classical probability theory.
We conclude this section with a technical remark. Namely, instead of
talking about presheaves over the context category V(H), which is a poset,
we can equivalently talk about sheaves if V(H) is equipped with the (lower)
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Alexandroff topology in which the open sets are the lower sets in V(H). Then,
by a standard result7 we have
Sh(V(H)A) ≃ Sets
V(H)op , (2.16)
where V(H)A denotes the poset V(H) equipped with the lower Alexandroff
topology. In what follows we will move freely between the language of
presheaves and that of sheaves—which of the two is being used should be
clear from the context.
3 A Topos Representation for Probabilities
The usual description of probabilities is by numbers in the interval [0, 1],
equipped with the total order inherited from R. In order to absorb prob-
abilities into the logic of a topos, our goal now is to find a topos, τ , such
that
[0, 1] ≃ ΓΩτ (3.1)
where Ωτ is the truth object in τ . A natural way of doing this is to look
for a topological space, X , whose open sets correspond bijectively with the
numbers between 0 and 1.
Since the global elements of the sub-object classifier Ωτ are the truth
values available in the topos τ , equation (3.1) means that probabilities will
correspond bijectively with truth values in the topos.
A straightforward idea is to use suitable lower sets in the unit interval
[0, 1]. These lower sets are required to form a topology, so the collection
of lower sets must be closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections.
The intervals of the form (0, r), where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, form a topology. Here
(0, 0) = ∅. The maximal element is (0, 1), so our topological space X actually
is the interval (0, 1) (and not [0, 1]). When regarding (0, 1) as a topological
space with the topology given by the sets of the form (0, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, we
denote it as (0, 1)L. We define a bijection
β : [0, 1]→ O((0, 1)L) (3.2)
r 7→ (0, r).
Note also that intervals of the form (0, r] would not work: they are not closed
under arbitrary unions. Take for example all intervals (0, ri] such that ri < r0
for some fixed r0 ∈ [0, 1]. Then
⋃
i(0, ri] = (0, r0).
7If A˘ denotes the sheaf associated with the presheaf A, then, on the open set ↓V , we
have A˘(↓V ) = AV for all V ∈ V(H). On an arbitrary lower set L ⊆ V(H), A˘(L) is the
(possibly empty) set of local sections of Σ over L.
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It may seem odd that a probability r ∈ [0, 1] is represented by the (open)
set (0, r), which does not contain r, but this is not problematic. In the
following, we will not interpret (0, r) as the collection of all probabilities
between 0 and r, but as an open set, which corresponds to a truth value
in a sheaf topos. This truth value, given by the structure of the topos,
corresponds to the probability r.
Now, a key idea in topos theory is that any topological space, X , should be
replaced with the topos, Sh(X), of sheaves over X . Furthermore, a standard
result is that there is an isomorphism of Heyting algebras.
O(X) ≃ ΓΩSh(X) (3.3)
It becomes clear that the topos we are seeking is Sh((0, 1)L). We will simplify
the notation ΩSh((0,1)L) to just Ω(0,1); thus
O((0, 1)L) ≃ ΓΩ
(0,1). (3.4)
We denote the isomorphism as σ : O((0, 1)L) → ΓΩ
(0,1). Its concrete form
will be discussed below.
It is clear that, for all stages (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1)L), the component Ω
(0,1)
r of
the sheaf Ω(0,1) is given by
Ω
(0,1)
(0,r) = {(0, r
′) | 0 < r′ ≤ r} ∪ ∅
= {(0, r′) | 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r}. (3.5)
We remark that instead of describing stages as (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1)L), we can
also think of r ∈ [0, 1] by the isomorphism (3.2).
We now define a key map ℓ that takes a probability p ∈ [0, 1] into a global
section of Ω(0,1), that is, a truth value in the topos. Roughly speaking, the
idea is that p is mapped to the open set (0, p), which is a truth value in
the sheaf topos. In fact, the map ℓ that we will define is nothing but the
composition σ ◦ β of the set isomorphisms β in (3.2) and σ in (3.4).
Concretely, we define for all p ∈ [0, 1] and all stages (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1)L)
the following sieve on (0, r):
ℓ(p)(0,r) := {(0, r
′) ∈ O((0, 1)L) | p ≥ r
′} (3.6)
= {(0, r′) | r′ = min{p, r}} (3.7)
where, by definition, (0, 0) = ∅. Thus we have
ℓ(p)(0,r) =


{(0, r′) ∈ O((0, 1)L) | r
′ ≤ r} = Ω
(0,1)
(0,r) if p ≥ r
{(0, r′) ∈ O((0, 1)L) | r
′ ≤ p} if 0 < p < r
∅ if p = 0
(3.8)
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or simpler
ℓ(p)r =


[0, r] = Ω(0,1)r if p ≥ r
[0, p] if 0 < p < r
∅ if p = 0.
(3.9)
Here, we used the bijection {(0, r′) ∈ O((0, 1)L) | r
′ ≤ r} ≃ [0, r], etc., which
of course is implied by equation (3.2).
4 The Construction of Truth Objects
4.1 The relation Γ(PO) ≃ Subcl(Σ)
The topos truth value (2.7) for a vector state |ψ〉 can be viewed in two ways.
The first employs the pseudo-state w |ψ〉 := δ( |ψ〉〈ψ| ) ∈ Subcl(Σ) where, in
the notation of local set theory, we have8
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
= [[w |ψ〉 ⊆ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ]] ∈ ΓΩ (4.1)
where the right hand side is well-defined since both w |ψ〉 and δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) are
clopen sub-objects of the spectral presheaf Σ.
Our goal is to find a family of ‘truth objects’, T |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H, with the
property that the topos truth value in (4.1) can be expressed alternatively
as
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
= [[ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ∈ T |ψ〉 ]] (4.2)
We note that for (4.2) to be meaningful, T |ψ〉 must be a sub-object of the
presheaf PclΣ.
In our earlier work on truth objects we constructed the quantities9 orgT |ψ〉,
|ψ〉 ∈ H, defined by
orgT
|ψ〉
V := {αˆ ∈ OV | Prob(αˆ; |ψ〉)} = 1
= {αˆ ∈ OV | 〈ψ| αˆ |ψ〉} = 1} (4.3)
for all V ∈ V(H). It can readily be checked that (4.3) defines a sub-object
of O. With the aid of the monic arrow ι : O → PclΣ this gives a sub-object
of PclΣ to which (4.2) applies.
8In local set theory, to any pair, S1, S2 of sub-objects of a third object A, there is
associated an element of ΓΩ, denoted [[S1 ⊂ S2 ]], which measures the ‘extent’ to which it is
true that S1 is a sub-object of S2. In our case, [[S1 ⊂ S2 ]](V ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | S1V ′ ⊆ S2V ′}
for all V ∈ V(H).
9The ‘org’ is short for ‘original’.
12
For discussing daseinised sub-objects of Σ like δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) the simple
definition in (4.3) is sufficient. However, the situation changes if we want to
consider more general sub-objects of Σ. Specifically, we want to define T |ψ〉
in such a way that
[[S ∈ T |ψ〉 ]] ∈ ΓΩ (4.4)
is well-defined for any clopen sub-object, S, of Σ. This is necessary to fulfil
our desire to relate topos truth values with measures on Subcl(Σ). Clopen
sub-objects of the form δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) have very special properties whereas our
measures are defined on arbitrary clopen sub-objects of Σ. This necessitates
a new definition of the truth objects T |ψ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H.
Evidently, clopen sub-objects of the spectral presheaf Σ are of particular
interest as the analogues of measurable subsets of a classical state space S.
More precisely, as in (2.11), each quantum state ρ determines a (Γ[0, 1]-
valued) ‘probability measure’, µρ, on Σ, with the clopen sub-objects play-
ing the role of measurable subsets; conversely, each probability measure on
Subcl(Σ) determines a unique quantum state. The proof relies on Gleason’s
theorem which shows that a quantum state is determined by the values it
takes on projections. As we shall see, clopen sub-objects have components
which correspond to projections, hence Gleason’s theorem is applicable.
It is very desirable to be able to express all clopen sub-objects of Σ in
terms of projection operators as these are the mathematical entities that
have the most direct physical meaning in quantum physics and they are also
relatively easy to manipulate.
As mentioned earlier, there is a monic arrow ι : O→ PclΣ and, therefore,
any global element of O leads to a clopen sub-object of Σ. However, ι is
not surjective and hence not all clopen sub-objects can be obtained in this
way. The remaining sub-objects can be recovered using the, so-called, hyper-
elements of O that were introduced in [6]. This is an intermediate step
towards realising our main goal, which is to find some object X in the topos
that (i) can be defined purely in terms of projection operators; and (ii) is
such that10
ΓX ≃ Subcl(Σ) (4.5)
We start by recalling that a global element of O is a family of elements
γˆV ∈ OV ≃ P(V ), V ∈ V(H), such that, for all pairs iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V we have
O(iV ′ V )(γˆV ) = γˆV ′ (4.6)
10The power object PΣ is not the correct choice as Γ(PΣ) ≃ Sub(Σ) and the latter
includes sub-objects of Σ that are not clopen; i.e., Subcl(Σ) ⊂ Sub(Σ).
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In other words
δ(γˆV )V ′ = γˆV ′. (4.7)
A hyper-element of O is a generalisation of this concept. Specifically, a
hyper-element is a family of elements γˆV ∈ OV , V ∈ V(H), such that, for all
pairs iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V we have [6]
O(iV ′ V )(γˆV )  γˆV ′ (4.8)
In other words
δ(γˆV )V ′  γˆV ′ . (4.9)
We denote the set of all hyper-elements of O as Hyp(O).
The importance of hyper-elements comes from the following results which
are proved in the Appendix.
1. There is a bijection
k : Hyp(O) → Subcl(Σ) (4.10)
k(γ)V := αV (γˆV ) = SγˆV
for all γ ∈ Hyp(O), V ∈ V(H) (see Proposition 7.1).
The inverse is
j : Subcl(Σ) → Hyp(O) (4.11)
j(S)V := α
−1
V (SV ) = PˆSV
for all S ∈ Subcl(Σ), V ∈ V(H).
2. There is a bijection
c : Sub(O) → Hyp(O) (4.12)
c(A)V :=
∨
{αˆ | αˆ ∈ AV }
for A ∈ Sub(O), V ∈ V(H) (see Proposition 7.2).
The inverse is
d : Hyp(O) → Sub(O) (4.13)
d(γ)V := {αˆ ∈ OV | αˆ  γˆV }
for all γ ∈ Hyp(O), V ∈ V(H).
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It follows from the above that there is a bijection
f : Sub(O) → Subcl(Σ) (4.14)
f(A)V := S∨{αˆ∈AV }
for all A ∈ Sub(O), V ∈ V(H). The inverse is
g : Subcl(Σ) → Sub(O) (4.15)
g(S)V := {αˆ ∈ OV | αˆ  PˆSV } (4.16)
for all S ∈ Subcl(Σ), V ∈ V(H). We simply define f := k ◦ c and g := d ◦ j
where the bijections c : Sub(O) → Hyp(O), k : Hyp(O) → Subcl(Σ), j :
Subcl(Σ)→ Hyp(O), and d : Hyp(O)→ Sub(O) are defined in (4.12), (4.10),
(4.11), and (4.13) respectively.
The problem posed in (4.5) can now be solved:
Proposition 4.1 The global elements of the power-object presheaf PO cor-
respond bijectively with the clopen sub-objects of Σ.
Proof. We have shown above that there is a bijective correspondence
Sub(O) ≃ Subcl(Σ) (4.17)
Now for any object A a fundamental property of the power object, PA, is
that Γ(PA) ≃ Sub(A). It follows from (4.14) that
Γ(PO) ≃ Subcl(Σ) (4.18)
At this point it is worth stating the well-known specific form of a power
object in a topos of presheaves. Specifically:
Definition 4.1 The power object PA of any presheaf A over V(H) is the
presheaf given by
(i) On objects V ∈ V(H), for all V ∈ V(H), PAV is defined as
PAV := {nV : A|↓V → Ω|↓V | nV is a natural transformation} (4.19)
where A
|↓V
is the restriction of the presheaf A to the smaller poset ↓
V ⊂ V(H), and analogously for Ω|↓V .
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(b) On morphisms iV ′V : V
′ → V ( i.e., V ′ ⊆ V ), the presheaf functions
PA(iV ′V ) : PAV → PAV ′ are defined as
PA(iV ′V ) : PAV → PAV ′
nV 7→ nV
′
|↓V (4.20)
Here, nV
′
|↓V is the obvious restriction of the natural transformation nV
to a natural transformation A|↓V ′ → Ω|↓V ′.
We now prove the ‘internal’ analogue of the ‘external’ isomorphism Sub(O) ≃
Subcl(Σ) in (4.14), namely:
Theorem 4.2 In the presheaf topos SetsV(H)
op
, there is an isomorphism
PO ≃ PclΣ (4.21)
between the power objects PO and PclΣ.
Proof.
It follows from (4.19) that an equivalent definition of PA is
PAV := Sub(A|↓V ) (4.22)
for all V ∈ V(H). In this form, the presheaf maps in (4.20) are just the
restriction of an object in Sub(A|↓V ) to ↓V
′ for all V ′ ⊆ V .
In particular, the Definition 4.1 (and equation (4.22)) applies to the power
object, PO, of the outer presheaf O. The presheaf PclΣ is defined in the same
way except only clopen sub-objects of Σ are used. Thus, for all V ∈ V(H),
we have
POV = Sub(O|↓V ) (4.23)
and
PclΣV = Subcl(Σ|↓V ) (4.24)
However, the bijection f : Sub(O) → Subcl(Σ) in (4.14) clearly gives rise to
a series of ‘local’ bijections
fV : Sub(O|↓V )→ Subcl(Σ|↓V ) (4.25)
for all V ∈ V(H). The inverse is
gV : Subcl(Σ|↓V )→ Sub(O|↓V ) (4.26)
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These local maps are consistent with subspace inclusions iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V ,
i.e., they are the components of two (mutually inverse) natural transforma-
tions
f : PO → PclΣ; g : PclΣ→ PO. (4.27)
Therefore, PO can be identified with the clopen power object PclΣ.
We note that we we also have the bijections
cV : Sub(O|↓V )→ Hyp(O|↓V ) (4.28)
with inverse
dV : Hyp(O|↓V )→ Sub(O|↓V ). (4.29)
4.2 Generalised truth objects
We first recall from (2.8) that the topos truth value in ΓΩ for a proposition
represented by a projection operator Pˆ is
ν
(
Pˆ ; |ψ〉
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | 〈ψ| δ(Pˆ )V ′ |ψ〉 = 1} (4.30)
for all V ∈ V(H). The expression in (4.30) can be usefully rewritten as
ν
(
Pˆ ; |ψ〉
)
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | δ(Pˆ )V ′  |ψ〉〈ψ| } (4.31)
and, similarly, the ‘original’ truth object given in (4.3) can be rewritten as
as
orgT
|ψ〉
V = {αˆ ∈ OV | αˆ  |ψ〉〈ψ| } (4.32)
As defined in (4.32), orgT |ψ〉 is a sub-object of O. The mathematical
expression [[ δ(Pˆ ) ∈ orgT |ψ〉 ]] only has meaning if orgT |ψ〉 can be regarded a
sub-object of PclΣ, which it can by virtue of the monic arrow O → PclΣ.
However, in order to give meaning to the valuations [[S ∈ T |ψ〉 ]] for an
arbitrary clopen sub-object, S of Σ we need to find a new expression for a
truth object that does not ‘factor’ through the monic O → PclΣ.
Using the isomorphism PO ≃ PclΣ proved in Proposition 4.2, the new
truth object can be regarded as a sub-object of PO. The concrete form of
PO can be written in several equivalent ways using the local isomorphisms
POV = Sub(O|↓V ) ≃ Hyp(O|↓V ) ≃ Subcl(Σ|↓V ). (4.33)
Specifically, we define the new truth object T |ψ〉 ⊂ PO as
T
|ψ〉
V := {A ∈ Sub(O|↓V ) | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ AV ′} (4.34)
≃ {γ ∈ Hyp(O|↓V ) | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, |ψ〉〈ψ|  γˆV ′} (4.35)
≃ {S ∈ Subcl(Σ|↓V ) | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, |ψ〉〈ψ|  PˆSV ′} (4.36)
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for all V ∈ V(H). For inclusions iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , the presheaf maps T |ψ〉(iV ′V ) :
T
|ψ〉
V → T
|ψ〉
V ′ are just the obvious restrictions from ↓V to ↓V
′.
We note that,11 using (4.34),
ΓT |ψ〉 ≃ {A ∈ Sub(O) | ∀V ∈ V(H), |ψ〉〈ψ| ∈ AV } (4.37)
with equivalent expressions using (4.35) and (4.36). In particular,
ΓT |ψ〉 ≃ {S ∈ Subcl(Σ) | ∀V ∈ V(H), |ψ〉〈ψ|  PˆSV } (4.38)
The topos truth value in (2.7) can now be rewritten as
ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
= [[ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ∈ T |ψ〉 ]] (4.39)
However, we can now also give meaning to the valuation [[S ∈ T |ψ〉 ]] for any
clopen subset, S of Σ, not just those of the form δ(Pˆ ) for some projection
operator Pˆ on H.
4.3 The truth objects Tρ,r, r ∈ (0, 1]
The truth objects will now be generalised by considering the one-parameter
family ν
(
−; ρ
)r
of valuations given by (2.10). For each density matrix, ρ,
and r ∈ [0, 1] we will associate a corresponding truth object Tρ,r.
Note that, strictly speaking, if r < 1 then Tρ,r should not be called a
‘truth’ object: its global elements represent propositions that are only true
with probability at least r in the state ρ. Although T |ψ〉,1 turns out to be
the truth object defined in (4.36), in general, for 0 < r < 1, we will get
collections of propositions that are not totally true in the state |ψ〉.12
The idea is to generalise condition (4.36), which played the key role in the
definition of T |ψ〉. This condition determines which projections can appear
as components of global elements of the truth object T |ψ〉. Thus this condi-
tion implements the requirement that a sub-object S ⊆ Σ which represents
a proposition that is totally true in the state |ψ〉 must have components
SV that are ‘true from the local perspective V ’, for all local perspectives
(i.e., contexts) V ∈ V(H). Each such component SV corresponds to a pro-
jection PˆSV in V and represents a proposition that is available in the context
11We also note that orgT |ψ〉 ∈ ΓT |ψ〉.
12We remark that mathematically, it is no problem to include the probability r = 0, but
from an interpretational viewpoint, one may want to exclude it, since global sections of
the truth object Tρ,0 represent propositions that are true with probability at least 0, and
every proposition fulfils this trivially.
18
V . This local proposition is (locally) true in the state |ψ〉 if and only if
|ψ〉〈ψ|  PˆSV holds for the projections.
We can now generalise this condition. If ρ |ψ〉 = |ψ〉〈ψ| is the density
matrix corresponding to the pure state |ψ〉 then
|ψ〉〈ψ|  Pˆ ⇐⇒ tr(ρ |ψ〉Pˆ ) = 1. (4.40)
Instead of demanding tr(ρ |ψ〉Pˆ ) = 1, we now just require tr(ρ |ψ〉Pˆ ) ≥ r, for
a given r ∈ [0, 1]. (For r = 0, the condition is trivially true.) We can also
extend the idea to general mixed states ρ and demand that tr(ρPˆ ) ≥ r.
The generalised truth object Tρ,r is defined using T |ψ〉 in (4.36) as an
analogue. Thus
T
ρ,r
V := {S ∈ Subcl(Σ|↓V ) | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ r} (4.41)
for all V ∈ V(H). For inclusions iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V , the presheaf maps Tρ,r(iV ′V ) :
T
ρ,r
V → T
ρ,r
V ′ are defined as the obvious restriction of sub-objects from ↓V to
↓V ′. Clearly, Tρ,r is a sub-object of the power object PO . We note that
T |ψ〉 = Tρψ ,1.
Lemma 4.3 For all states ρ and all real coefficients ( i.e., probabilities) 0 ≤
r1 < r2 ≤ 1, we have
Tρ,r1 ⊇ Tρ,r2. (4.42)
Proof. The assertion is that for all V ∈ V(H)
T
ρ,r1
V ⊇ T
ρ,r2
V . (4.43)
By the definition in (4.41), Tρ,r2V is the family of clopen sub-objects S of
Σ↓V such that for all V
′ ∈↓V we have tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ r2. But since r1 < r2,
tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ r2 implies tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) > r1 for all V
′ ∈↓V . Hence, Tρ,r2V ⊆ T
ρ,r1
V .
This result expresses the fact that the collection of sub-objects that rep-
resent propositions which are true with probability at least r1 is bigger than
the collection of sub-objects which represents propositions that are true with
probability at least r2 > r1. However, the generalised truth objects T
ρ,r1 ,Tρ,r2
are only collections of sub-objects locally (in V ). Globally they are presheaves
whose global elements are sub-objects of Σ that represent propositions which
are true with probability at least r1, resp. r2, in the state ρ. Note that the
result Tρ,r2 ⊆ Tρ,r1 ⊆ PO implies that ΓTρ,r2 ⊆ ΓTρ,r1.
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It can now be shown that
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
= [[ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ∈ Tρ,r ]] (4.44)
for all r ∈ [0, 1] where, as in (2.10), for all stages V ∈ V(H), we define
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | tr
(
ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′
)
≥ r}. (4.45)
There is no (obvious) analogue for ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
of the pseudo-state option
in (4.1) for ν
(
Aε∆; |ψ〉
)
and hence, in what follows, we will focus on the
use of truth objects.
4.4 A topos perspective on classical probability theory
Before we proceed to develop a topos version of quantum probabilities, we
first sketch a topos perspective on classical probability theory. This is inter-
esting in its own right and also provides guidance for the quantum case later
on.
Thus, suppose X is a space with a probability measure µ : Sub(X) →
[0, 1]. Here, Sub(X) denotes the µ-measurable subsets of X . Then we wish
to describe this situation using the topos Sh((0, 1)L) discussed in Section
3. As a first step we define the sheaf X as the e´tale bundle over (0, 1)L
with constant stalk X over each (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1)L); in terms of the usual
notation, X := ∆X . Similarly, for any measurable subset S ⊆ X of X we
define S := ∆S. Thus there is a map
∆ : Sub(X) → SubSh((0,1)L)(X)
S 7→ S := ∆S. (4.46)
Motivated by (4.41) we then define the sheaf Tµ in Sh((0, 1)L) by
T
µ
(0,r) := {S ⊆ X | µ(S) ≥ r} (4.47)
at all stages (0, r) ∈ O((0, 1)L). Using the isomorphism (3.2), we denote the
stages as r, where r ∈ [0, 1]:
Tµr := {S ⊆ X | µ(S) ≥ r}. (4.48)
Note that, here, r labels the stages, while in (4.41) r is fixed. If r1 < r2, the
presheaf maps Tµ(r1 < r2) : T
µ
r2
→ Tµr1 are defined in the obvious (trivial)
way:
Tµ(r1 < r2) : T
µ
r2
→ Tµr1 (4.49)
S 7→ S. (4.50)
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It is easy to show that this defines a sheaf over the topological space (0, 1)L.
Now, S is a sub-object of X, and Tµ is sub-object of PX.13 Therefore,
the valuation [[S ∈ Tµ ]] is well-defined as an element of ΓΩ(0,1). Specifically,
at each stage r ∈ [0, 1] we have
[[S ∈ Tµ ]](r) := {r′ ≤ r | Sr′ ∈ T
µ
r′}
= {r′ ≤ r | µ(S) ≥ r′} (4.51)
= [0, µ(S)] ∩ (0, r] (4.52)
= [0,min{µ(S), r}], (4.53)
which, as required, belongs to Ω(0,1)r = Ω
(0,1)
(0,r). The resemblance to (4.45) is
clear and suggests that in the quantum-theoretical expression the parameter
r should be viewed as a ‘stage of truth’ associated with the topos Sh((0, 1)L).
We return to this in the next Section.
It is clear from (4.51) that, for any subset S ⊆ X , the value of µ(S) can
be recovered from the valuation/global element [[S ∈ Tµ ]] ∈ ΓΩ(0,1] in the
topos Sh((0, 1]L). More precisely, the map µ : Sub(X) → [0, 1] determines,
and is determined by, the map ξµ : SubSh((0,1)L)(X)→ ΓΩ
(0,1] defined as
ξµ(S) := [[S ∈ Tµ ]] (4.54)
for all S ∈ SubSh((0,1)L)(X). Thus we have replaced the measure µ with the
collection of truth values [[S ∈ Tµ ]] ∈ ΓΩ(0,1), where S ⊆ X . Of course, in
the present case this is rather trivial, but it gives insight into how to proceed
in the quantum theory.
Actually, the classical result has some interest in its own right. Essentially
we have a new interpretation of classical probability in which the results
are expressed in terms of truth values in the sheaf topos Sh((0, 1)L). This
suggests a ‘realist’ (or ‘neo-realist’) interpretation of probability theory that
could replace the conventional (for a scientist) instrumentalist interpretation
in terms of relative frequencies of measurements.
We also remark that the truth values, given by ΓΩ(0,1), form a Heyting
algebra, which is one aspect of the intuitionistic logic of the topos. One
well-known realist view of probability is the propensity theory in which a
probability is viewed as the propensity, or tendency, or potentiality, of the
associated event to occur. Thus the results above might be used to give
a precise mathematical definition of propensities in terms of the Heyting
13In the context of a formal language for the system, Tµ is of type PPX and any ∆S
is of type PX (see [5, 10] for more details on the use of types).
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algebra ΓΩ(0,1), though it should be remarked that the role of the Heyting
algebra structure is not entirely clear at the moment.
Using the map ℓ : [0, 1]→ ΓΩ(0,1) defined in (3.6), we obtain
[ℓ ◦ µ(S)](r) = ℓ(µ(S))(r) = {(0, r′) ⊆ (0, r) | µ(S) ≥ r′}
= [[S ∈ Tµ ]](r) = ξµ(∆(S))(r) (4.55)
for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Thus
ℓ ◦ µ = ξµ ◦∆ (4.56)
in the commutative diagram
Sub(X)
µ
- [0, 1]
SubSh((0,1)L)(X)
∆
?
ξµ
- ΓΩ(0,1)
ℓ
?
(4.57)
This diagram will provide an important analogue in the following discussion
of the quantum theory.
A measure µ is usually taken to be σ-additive, that is, for any countable
family (Si)i∈N of pairwise disjoint, measurable subsets of X , we have
µ(
⋃
i
Si) =
∑
i
µ(Si). (4.58)
We reformulate this property slightly. Let S˜0 := S0, and for each i > 0,
define recursively
S˜i := S˜i−1 ∪ Si. (4.59)
Then (S˜i)i∈N is a countable increasing family of measurable subsets of X .
Now σ-additivity can be expressed as
µ(
∨
i
S˜i) = µ(
⋃
i
S˜i) = sup
i
µ(S˜i) =
∨
i
µ(S˜i), (4.60)
that is, µ preserves countable joins (suprema).
The map ℓ : [0, 1]→ ΓΩ(0,1), defined in (3.9), also preserves joins, as can
be seen easily: let (pi)i∈I be a family of real numbers in the unit interval
[0, 1] (the family need not be countable). Then
ℓ(
∨
i
pi)r = ℓ(sup
i
pi)r =


[0, r] = Ω(0,1)r if supi pi ≥ r
[0, supi pi] if 0 < supi pi < r
∅ if supi pi = 0
(4.61)
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and
∨
i
ℓ(pi)r =
∨
i


[0, r] = Ω(0,1)r if pi ≥ r
[0, pi] if 0 < pi < r
∅ if pi = 0,
(4.62)
which directly implies ℓ(
∨
i pi)r =
∨
i(ℓ(pi)r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Since joins are
defined stage-wise in ΓΩ(0,1), we obtain
ℓ(
∨
i
pi) =
∨
i
ℓ(pi). (4.63)
Hence, the composite map ℓ◦µ : Sub(X)→ ΓΩ(0,1) preserves countable joins
of increasing families (S˜i)i∈N of measurable subsets, that is,
(ℓ ◦ µ)(
∨
i
S˜i) =
∨
i
(ℓ ◦ µ)(S˜i). (4.64)
Note that ℓ ◦ µ corresponds to the upper-right path through the diagram
(4.57). Since the diagram commutes, the left-lower path, i.e., the map ξµ◦∆,
also preserves such joins,
(ξµ ◦∆)(
∨
i
S˜i) = (ℓ ◦ µ)(
∨
i
S˜i) =
∨
i
(ℓ ◦ µ)(S˜i). (4.65)
This is the logical reformulation of σ-additivity of the measure µ.
5 Application to Quantum Theory
5.1 The maps jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ, r ∈ (0, 1]
These ideas will now be applied to quantum theory, keeping in mind the
commutative diagram in (4.57) whose quantum analogue we seek. We already
have the analogue of µ : Sub(X) → [0, 1] in the form of the measures µρ :
Subcl(Σ) → Γ[0, 1]
 where ρ is a density matrix. The challenge is to fill in
the rest of the diagram for the quantum case.
The first step is to see if Γ[0, 1] can be associated with ΓΩ in some way.
To do this note that the ‘0’ and ‘1’ that appear in Γ[0, 1] refer to probability
0 and 1, and in that sense correspond to ‘false’ and ‘true’ respectively. To
clarify this we first define, for each r ∈ [0, 1], the global element γr ∈ Γ[0, 1]

as
γr(V ) := r (5.1)
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for all V ∈ V(H). Then µρ(∅) = γ0 and µ
ρ(Σ) = γ1, which suggests the
sections γ0 and γ1 are to be associated respectively with ⊥Ω and ⊤Ω in ΓΩ .
Next define a map j : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩ by
j(γ)(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | γ(V ′) = 1} (5.2)
for V ∈ V(H). This is a sieve on V since once γ(V ′) becomes ‘true’ (i.e., equal
to 1) it remains so because γ is a nowhere-increasing function. Note that if
γr denotes the ‘constant’ section with value r then
j(γr)(V ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | r = 1} (5.3)
so that
j(γr) =
{
⊤Ω if r = 1
⊥Ω if r < 1
(5.4)
Note also that, to each density matrix ρ and projection operator Pˆ , there
corresponds a global element γPˆ ,ρ ∈ Γ[0, 1]
 defined by
γPˆ ,ρ(V ) := tr
(
ρ δ(Pˆ )V
)
(5.5)
for all V ∈ V(H). Hence
j(γPˆ ,ρ)(V ) = {V
′ ⊆ V | tr
(
ρ δ(Pˆ )V
)
= 1}. (5.6)
Our intention is to consider Γ[0, 1] as the quantum analogue of [0, 1] in the
diagram (4.57).
Returning to the definition (5.2) of j : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩ, we now make
the critical observation that there is a natural one-parameter family of maps
jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ, r ∈ (0, 1], defined by
jr(γ)(V ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | γ(V ′) ≥ r} (5.7)
for all stages V ∈ V(H). Thus (5.2) is just the special case j = j1.
It is important to note that the parameter r in (5.7) has been chosen to
lie in (0, 1] rather than [0, 1]. This is because, for all γ ∈ Γ[0, 1], for r = 0
we have {V ′ ⊆ V | γ(V ′) ≥ 0} =↓V = ⊤ΩV for all V ∈ V(H). In particular,
even if γ = 0 we would still assign the truth value ‘totally true’.
To interpret this, suppose we choose ∆ to lie completely outside the
spectrum of Aˆ. Then Eˆ[Aε∆] = 0ˆ, the null projection representing the
trivially false proposition in standard quantum theory. Eˆ[Aε∆] = 0ˆ implies
that δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V = 0ˆ for all V , which corresponds to the empty subobject
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∅ ∈ Subcl(Σ), the representative of the trivially false proposition in the topos
approach to quantum theory. For any quantum state ρ, the corresponding
probability measure µρ : Subcl(Σ) → Γ[0, 1]
 will map the empty subobject
∅ to the global element γ0ˆ,ρ = 0, the global element that is constantly 0 (see
(2.11) and (5.5); for details, see [11]). From (5.7), we obtain
jr(γ0ˆ,ρ)(V ) = ∅ (5.8)
for all r > 0, while for r = 0,
j0(γ0ˆ,ρ)(V ) = ⊤ΩV . (5.9)
The latter means that we assign ‘totally true’ to the trivially false proposition,
which we want to avoid by excluding r = 0. Note that only for r = 0, we
get ‘totally true’, for all r > 0, we obtain ‘totally false’. It is a matter of
interpretation if one wants to allow that even the trivially false proposition
can be true with probability 0 (since any proposition is true with at least
probability 0), or if the proposition that conventionally is interpreted as
trivially false must be totally false. In the latter case, one must exclude the
case r = 0, as we will do here. This has no bearing on our results.
For later reference, we note that in quantum theory, γPˆ ,ρ(V ) := tr(ρ δ(Pˆ )V )
(see (5.5)) and hence
jr(γPˆ ,ρ)(V ) = {V
′ ⊆ V | tr(ρ δ(Pˆ )V ′) ≥ r} (5.10)
so that, in particular,
jr(γEˆ[Aε∆],ρ)(V ) = {V
′ ⊆ V | tr(ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′) ≥ r}
= ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
(V ) (5.11)
for all V ∈ V(H).
Now we come to an important result.
Theorem 5.1 The family of maps jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ, r ∈ (0, 1], is separat-
ing: i.e., if, for all r ∈ (0, 1] we have jr(γ1) = jr(γ2) then γ1 = γ2.
Proof. Suppose there are γ1 and γ2 in Γ[0, 1]
 such that γ1 6= γ2. Then
there exists V0 ∈ V(H) such that γ1(V0) 6= γ2(V0). Without loss of generality
we can assume that γ1(V0) > γ2(V0). Now consider
jγ1(V0)(γ2)(V0) = {V
′ ⊆ V0 | γ2(V
′) ≥ γ1(V0)} (5.12)
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and
jγ1(V0)(γ1)(V0) = {V
′ ⊆ V0 | γ1(V
′) ≥ γ1(V0)} (5.13)
Equation (5.13) shows that jγ1(V0)(γ1)(V0) is the principal sieve ↓V0 on V0.
On the other hand, since γ1(V0) > γ2(V0), γ2(V0) cannot belong to the sieve
jγ1(V0)(γ1)(V0). It follows that
jγ1(V0)(γ1) 6= jγ1(V0)(γ2) (5.14)
and hence the family of maps {jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ | r ∈ (0, 1]} is separating.
5.2 The map ℓ : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L)
As shown above, the one-parameter family of maps jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ,
r ∈ (0, 1], defined as
jr(γ)(V ) := {V
′ ⊆ V | γ(V ′) ≥ r} (5.15)
separates the members of Γ[0, 1] and, therefore, density matrices. Our goal
now is to combine this parameterised family to form a single map from
Γ[0, 1] to ΓΩτ where Ωτ is the sub-object classifier of some new topos τ .
The first step in this direction is the result gained from combining (3.2)
and (3.4), giving the isomorphism
ℓ : [0, 1]→ ΓΩ(0,1) (5.16)
which, as discussed in Section 4.4, enables a topos-logic interpretation to be
given to classical probability theory. The key results are summarised in the
commutative diagram in (4.57).
We remark that, on the face of it, (5.16) is an isomorphism of sets, not
Heyting algebras. By the isomorphism (3.2), we could regard [0, 1] as a Heyt-
ing algebra, since O((0, 1L)) is a Heyting algebra (as the open sets of any
topological space form a Heyting algebra). Since (3.4) is a Heyting alge-
bra isomorphism, too, we could see (5.16) as an isomorphism of (complete)
Heyting algebras.
Yet, there is little to be gained from this: the measure µ : Sub(X)→ [0, 1]
is not a Heyting algebra morphism, so in the commutative diagram (4.57),
we have some morphisms which are Heyting algebra morphisms, while others
are not. We consider the fact that [0, 1] can be seen as a Heyting algebra, and
ℓ as a Heyting algebra isomorphism, as coincidental. It is more important
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that ℓ is a set isomorphism, and is obviously order-preserving. This means
that ℓ represents probabilities faithfully as truth values in our sheaf topos.
Moreover, there are no other truth values apart from those corresponding
with probabilities.
Yet, there is aspect of ℓ being a morphism of complete Heyting algebras
that we do use: namely, the preservation of joins which plays a key role in
the logical reformulation of the σ-additivity of a measure µ, as described at
the end of subsection 4.4.
In the quantum case, we can give the set of ‘generalised probabilities’,
i.e., the codomain Γ[0, 1] of our probability measures, the structure of a
partially ordered set in the obvious way: let γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ[0, 1]
, then
γ1  γ2 :⇐⇒ γ1(V ) ≤ γ2(V ) (5.17)
for all V ∈ V(H).
Let us now consider again the one-parameter family of topos truth values
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
(V ) := {V ′ ⊆ V | tr(ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′) ≥ r} (5.18)
for all stages V ∈ V(H). Here, r ∈ (0, 1] and, as shown in (5.11),
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)r
= jr(γEˆ[Aε∆],ρ) (5.19)
We recall also the result from classical probability theory in (4.51)
[[S ∈ Tµ ]](r) = {r′ ≤ r | µ(S) ≥ r′} (5.20)
Now, (5.20) is a sieve on the stage r in the sub-object classifier, ΩSh((0,1)L),
in the topos Sh((0, 1)L), and (5.18) is a sieve on the stage V in the topos
Sh(V(H)A). These results strongly suggest that the way of ‘combining’ the
one-parameter family jr : Γ[0, 1]
 → ΓΩ, r ∈ (0, 1] is to use sieves on pairs
〈V, r〉 ∈ V(H)× (0, 1) with the ordering
〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 iff V ′ ⊆ V and r′ ≤ r. (5.21)
We recall from equation (2.16) that (i) V(H)A denotes the context cat-
egory, which is a poset, equipped with the lower Alexandroff topology, and
(ii) there is an isomorphism of topoi SetsV(H)
op
→ Sh(V(H)A).
We put the product topology on the poset V(H)A × (0, 1)L. The basic
opens sets in this topology are of the form
↓V × (0, r) (5.22)
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for V ∈ V(H) and r ∈ [0, 1]. In the following, we will identify such a basic
open with the pair 〈V, r〉, which makes some formulas easier to read.
Obviously, we are now interested in the sheaf topos Sh(V(H)A× (0, 1)L),
where we can define ℓ : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) as
ℓ(γ)(〈V, r〉) := {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | γ(V ′) ≥ r′} (5.23)
That this is a sieve on 〈V, r〉 ∈ O(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) follows because γ is a
nowhere-increasing function. In particular, we have
ℓ(γδ(Eˆ[Aε∆]),ρ)(〈V, r〉) := {〈V
′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | γδ(Eˆ[Aε∆]),ρ)(V
′) ≥ r′}
= {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | tr(ρ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])V ′
)
≥ r′} (5.24)
In this context it is important to note that the map ℓ : Γ[0, 1] →
ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) clearly separates the elements of Γ[0, 1], as follows from an
obvious analogue of the proof of Theorem 5.1. For suppose there are γ1 and γ2
such that γ1 6= γ2. Then there exists V0 ∈ V(H) such that γ1(V0) 6= γ2(V0).
Without loss of generality we can assume that γ1(V0) > γ2(V0). Then we
compare
ℓ(γ2)
(
〈V0, γ2(V0)〉
)
:= {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V0, γ2(V0)〉 | γ2(V
′) ≥ r′} = ↓〈V0, γ2(V0)〉
(5.25)
with
ℓ(γ1)
(
〈V0, γ2(V0)〉
)
:= {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V0, γ2(V0)〉 | γ1(V
′) ≥ r′} ( ↓〈V0, γ2(V0)〉
(5.26)
It follows that ℓ(γ2) 6= ℓ(γ1), as claimed. This means that the map ℓ :
Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) is injective.
We show that ℓ preserves joins: let (γi)i∈I ⊂ Γ[0, 1]
 be a family of global
elements of [0, 1], then
ℓ(
∨
i
γi)(〈V, r〉) = {〈V
′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | (
∨
i
γi)(V
′) ≥ r′} (5.27)
= {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | sup
i
γi(V
′) ≥ r′} (5.28)
=
⋃
i
({〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | γi(V
′) ≥ r′}) (5.29)
=
∨
i
ℓ(γi)(〈V, r〉). (5.30)
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Since this holds for all stages 〈V, r〉14 and joins in ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) are de-
fined stagewise, we obtain
ℓ(
∨
i
γi) =
∨
i
ℓ(γi). (5.31)
5.3 The truth object Tρ
Our intention is that (5.24) will be the truth value of the proposition “Aε∆”
when the quantum state is the density matrix ρ. The topos in question is
Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) and, for notational convenience, we will denote a sheaf
on V(H)A × (0, 1)L by a symbol A to distinguish it from the symbol B for
a sheaf on V(H)A (or, equivalently, a presheaf over V(H)). A key step will
be to define a truth object Tρ from which (5.24) follows as the correct truth
value.
The first step is to construct certain physically important sheaves over
V(H)A × (0, 1)L. To this end define the projection maps p1 : V(H)A ×
(0, 1)L → V(H)A and p2 : V(H)A × (0, 1)L → (0, 1)L. These can be used to
pull-back sheaves over V(H)A or (0, 1)L to give sheaves over V(H)A× (0, 1)L.
Thus, if C is a sheaf on V(H)A we have
(p∗1C)〈V,r〉 = CV (5.32)
at each stage 〈V, r〉 ∈ O(V(H)A × (0, 1)L).
A key step is to identify the state object and quantity-value object in
this new topos Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L). We will make the simplest assumption
that there is no r-dependence in the state object: indeed, from a physical
perspective it is hard to see where such a dependence could come from.
Therefore, we define the state object in Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) as
Σ := p∗1Σ. (5.33)
In the topos Sh(V(H)A) a quantum proposition associated with the pro-
jector Pˆ is represented by the clopen sub-object, δ(Pˆ ), of Σ. In the light of
(5.33) it is then natural to assume that the sub-object that represents the
quantum proposition is just
δ(Pˆ ) := p∗1δ(Pˆ ). (5.34)
14Strictly speaking, the stages 〈V, r〉 =↓V × (0, r) give just a basis of the topology on
V(H)A × (0, 1)L, so we would have to consider arbitrary unions of these sets to describe
all stages. This clearly poses no difficulty.
29
The quantity-value object must then be defined as
R := p∗1R (5.35)
where R is the quantity-value object in Sh(V(H)A). This guarantees that
the Sh(V(H)A)-representation of a physical quantity by an arrow A˘ : Σ→ R
will translate into a representation in Sh(V(H)A× (0, 1)L) by an arrow from
Σ to R.
All the objects in Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) defined above are obtained by a
trivial pull-back from the corresponding objects in Sh(V(H)A). The critical,
non-trivial, object is the truth object Tρ. One anticipates that this will be
derived in some way from the one-parameter family, r 7→ Tρ,r, r ∈ (0, 1]
defined in (4.41).
In fact, the obvious choice works. Namely, define Tρ as
Tρ
〈V,r〉
:= Tρ,rV = {S ∈ Subcl(Σ|↓V ) | ∀V
′ ⊆ V, tr(ρPˆSV ′ ) ≥ r} (5.36)
for all stages 〈V, r〉 ∈ O(V(H)A × (0, 1)L).
This equation shows that Tρ is a sub-object of PΣ, and δ(Pˆ ) is a sub-
object of Σ. It follows that the valuation [[ δ(Pˆ ) ∈ Tρ ]] is well-defined as
an element of ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L). The value at any basic open 〈V, r〉 =↓
V × (0, 1) ∈ O(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) is
[[ δ(Pˆ ) ∈ Tρ ]]〈V, r〉 = {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | tr(ρ δ(Pˆ )V ′
)
≥ r′} (5.37)
which, as anticipated, is just (5.24). In summary, the truth value associated
with the proposition“Aε∆” in the quantum state ρ is
ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)
:= [[ δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ∈ Tρ ]] ∈ ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) (5.38)
The equation (5.38) is the main result of our paper. The critical feature of
the truth value, (5.38), in the topos Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L) is that it separates
density matrices, in marked contrast to the more elementary truth value,
(2.9), in the topos Sh(V(H)).
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5.4 The analogy with classical probability theory
The analogy with classical probability is quite striking. This, we recall, is
summarised by the commutative diagram
Sub(X)
µ
- [0, 1]
SubSh((0,1)L)(X)
∆
?
ξµ
- ΓΩ(0,1)
ℓ
?
(5.39)
Our claim is that there is a precise quantum analogue of this, namely the
commutative diagram
Subcl(Σ)
µρ
- Γ[0, 1]
Subcl(Σ)
p∗1
?
ξρ
- ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L)
ℓ
?
(5.40)
The only map in (5.40) that has not been defined already is
ξρ : Subcl(Σ)→ ΓΩ
Sh(V(H)A×(0,1)L). (5.41)
Motivated by the construction (4.54) in the classical case, we define
ξρ(S) := [[S ∈ Tρ ]] (5.42)
for all sub-objects S of Σ. We now observe that (5.37) can be rewritten as
[[ p∗1δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T
ρ ]]〈V, r〉 := {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | µρ(δ(Pˆ )
V ′
) ≥ r′} (5.43)
where we have used that fact that δ(Pˆ ) := p∗1δ(Pˆ ).
However, ℓ : Γ[0, 1] → ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) was defined in (5.23) as
ℓ(γ)(〈V, r〉) := {〈V ′, r′〉  〈V, r〉 | γ(V ′) ≥ r′} (5.44)
and so it follows that
ξρ(p∗1δ(Pˆ )) = [[ p
∗
1δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T
ρ ]] = ℓ ◦ µρ
(
δ(Pˆ )
)
(5.45)
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It is easy to check that this equation actually applies to any clopen sub-object
of Σ, not just those of the form δ(Pˆ ). Thus (5.40) is indeed a commutative
diagram.
The equation (5.45) is the precise statement of the relationship between
the topos truth value, [[ p∗1δ(Pˆ ) ∈ T
ρ ]], in ΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) and the measure
µρ : Subcl(Σ)→ Γ[0, 1]
.
If we consider a normal quantum state ρ (i.e., a state that corresponds
to a density matrix, that is, a convex combination of vector states), then we
obtain a measure µρ : Subcl(Σ)→ Γ[0, 1]
 that is σ-additive in the following
sense. Let (Si)i∈N be a countable, increasing family of clopen subobjects,
then
µρ(
∨
i
Si) =
∨
i
µρ(Si). (5.46)
This is equivalent to Corollary IV.2 in [11]. Compare this formula with (4.60):
the corresponding result for classical, σ-additive measures.
Together with the fact that ℓ preserves joins, as proven in subsection
5.2, this implies that ℓ ◦ µρ : Subcl(Σ) → ΓΩ
Sh(V(H)A×(0,1)L) preserves count-
able joins of increasing families (Si)i∈N of clopen subobjects. Since, by the
commutativity of the diagram (5.40), ℓ ◦ µρ = ξρ ◦ p∗1, we have
(ξρ ◦ p∗1)(
∨
i
Si) = (ℓ ◦ µ
ρ)(
∨
i
Si) =
∨
i
(ℓ ◦ µρ)(Si). (5.47)
This is the logical reformulation of normality (i.e., σ-additivity) of the quan-
tum state ρ.
5.5 The Born rule and its logical reformulation
The diagram (5.40) encodes a logical version of the Born rule. Proposi-
tions “Aε∆” are represented by clopen subobjects in the topos approach.
Specifically, the proposition “Aε∆” is represented by the clopen subobject
δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]) ∈ Subcl(Σ). The measure µ
ρ maps this clopen subobject to a
global element of [0, 1],
µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])) ∈ Γ[0, 1]. (5.48)
For each V ∈ V(H), we have µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]))(V ) ∈ [0, 1]. As was shown in
[11] (and as can be seen from (2.11)), the smallest value µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]))(V )
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of this global element is nothing but the usual expectation value of the pro-
jection Eˆ[Aε∆] in the state ρ, that is
tr(ρEˆ[Aε∆]) = min
V ∈V(H)
µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]))(V ). (5.49)
In this sense, the topos approach reproduces the Born rule (for projections)
and rephrases it in terms of probability measures on the spectral presheaf
Σ.15 In standard quantum theory, the expectation value tr(ρEˆ[Aε∆]) is in-
terpreted as the probability that upon measurement of the physical quantity
A in the state ρ, the measurement outcome will lie in the Borel set ∆ ⊆ R.
This is an instrumentalist interpretation that crucially depends on concepts
of measurement and observation.
We can now map the global element µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])) of [0, 1] by ℓ to
a truth value in the sheaf topos Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L). As observed earlier,
this map is injective, which means that we faithfully capture the information
contained in µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])) by the truth value ℓ(µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]))).
As we saw in (5.49), the expectation value tr(ρEˆ[Aε∆]), obtained from
the Born rule, is only the minimal value of the global element µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆])),
hence this global element and its image under ℓ, the truth value in the sheaf
topos, contain more information than just the expectation value. In future
work, we will consider the question what this extra information means phys-
ically. For now, we just emphasise that the truth value
ℓ(µρ(δ(Eˆ[Aε∆]))) (5.50)
of the proposition “Aε∆” in the state ρ can be interpreted in a realist
manner: the proposition refers to the physical world, the state is the state of
the system (and not a description of an ensemble, or a state of knowledge,
or similar), and the truth value represents one aspect of how things are,
independent of measurements and observers. Moreover, all propositions have
truth values in all states.
6 Conclusions
Over the years there have been a number of attempts to understand quan-
tum theory with the aid of some sort of multi-valued logic, usually related
some way to probabilistic ideas. The earliest attempt was by the Polish
15This can be extended to expectation values of arbitrary self-adjoint operators, as was
shown in [11].
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mathematician Lukasiewicz [23] after whose work a number of philosophers
of science have made a variety of proposals.
Much of this work involved three-valued logic, the most famous proponent
of which was probably Reichenbach [20]. One problem commonly faced by
such schemes is an uncertainty of how to define the logical connectives.
Lukasiewicz logic that is infinite-valued has also been studied, and this
includes logics whose truth values lie in [0, 1]. This leads naturally to the
subject of fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory. We refer the reader to the very
useful review by Pykacz [22] which introduces the historical background to
these ideas. Another attempt to relate probability to logic is that of Carnap
whose work, like much else, has largely disappeared into the hazy past [21] .
Our topos approach is different to any of the existing schemes and, we
would claim, is better motivated and underpinned with very powerful math-
ematical machinery. We have no problem defining logical connectives as this
structure is given uniquely by the theory. That is, the propositional logic is
given by the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ), and the possible truth values belong
to the Heyting algebra ΓΩ.
In the topos theory, truth values are not only multi-valued, they are also
contextual in a way that is deeply tied to the underlying quantum theory.
That explains why our probability measures are not simply [0, 1]-valued but
are associated with arrows from Subcl(Σ) to (global elements of) the presheaf
[0, 1].
In the present paper we make the strong claim that standard, classical
probability theory can be faithfully represented by the global elements of the
sub-object classifier, Ω(0,1), in the topos, Sh((0, 1)L), of sheaves on the topo-
logical space (0, 1)L, whose open sets correspond bijectively to probabilities
in the interval [0, 1]. This tight link between classical probability measures
and Heyting algebras is captured precisely in the commutative map diagram
in (4.57). This approach to probability theory allows for a new type of
non-instrumentalist interpretation that might be particularly appropriate in
‘propensity’ schemes.
What, to us, is rather striking is that the same can be said about the
interpretation of probability in quantum theory. The relevant commutative
diagram here is (5.40) which shows how our existing topos quantum theory,
which uses the topos Sh(V(H)A), can be combined with our suggested topos
approach to probability, which uses the topos Sh((0, 1)L), to give a new topos
quantum scheme which involves sheaves in the topos Sh(V(H)A × (0, 1)L).
As we have seen, in this scheme, results of quantum theory be coded
in either (i) the topos probability measures µρ : Subcl(Σ) → [0, 1]
 (which
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reinforces our slogan “Quantum physics is equivalent to classical physics in
the appropriate topos”); or (ii) the topos truth values, ν
(
Aε∆; ρ
)
, defined
in (5.38), which take their values in the Heyting algebra ΓΩSh(V(H)A×(0,1)L).
Thus, in both classical and quantum physics, probability can be faithfully
interpreted using truth values in sheaf topoi with an intuitionistic logic.
7 Appendix
We prove some technical results here.
First, we recall the definition in (2.3) of the isomorphism αV : P(V ) =
OV → Cl(ΣV ) between the projections in V and the clopen subsets of the
Gel’fand spectrum, ΣV , of V . A basic property of this assignment is the
existence of the commutative squares:
Cl(ΣV ) ff
αV
P(V )
Cl(ΣV ′)
Σ(iV ′V )
?
ff
αV ′
P(V ′)
O(iV ′V ) = δ(·)V ′
?
(7.1)
and
Cl(ΣV )
α−1V - P(V )
Cl(ΣV ′)
Σ(iV ′V )
?
α−1V ′
- P(V ′).
O(iV ′V ) = δ(·)V ′
?
(7.2)
Proposition 7.1 There is a bijection k : Hyp(O)→ Subcl(Σ) defined for all
γ ∈ Hyp(O) by
k(γ)V := αV (γˆV ) = SγˆV (7.3)
for all V ∈ V(H).
Proof. First, let γ ∈ Hyp(O). In order for k(γˆ) to be a (clopen) sub-object of
Σ, it is necessary and sufficient that, for all V ′, V ∈ V(H) with iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V ,
we have
Σ(iV ′V )
(
k(γ)V ) ⊆ k(γ)V ′ (7.4)
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However, the commutative square in (7.1) gives
Σ(iV ′V )(Sαˆ) = SO(iV ′V )(αˆ) = Sδ(αˆ)V ′ (7.5)
for all αˆ ∈ OV and for all V, V
′ ∈ V(H) with iV ′V : V
′ ⊆ V . Because γ is a
hyper-element of O we have δ(γˆV )V ′  γˆV ′, and hence
Σ(iV ′V )
(
k(γ)V
)
= Σ(iV ′V )
(
SγˆV
)
(7.6)
= Sδ(γˆV )V ′ ⊆ SγˆV ′ = k(γ)V ′ (7.7)
which proves (7.4), as required. Thus the map k in (7.3) defines a clopen
sub-object of Σ.
Conversely, define a map j : Subcl(Σ)→ Hyp(O) by
j(S)V := α
−1
V (SV ) = PˆSV (7.8)
for all S ∈ Subcl(Σ) and for all V ∈ V(H). To check that the right hand
side of (7.8) is indeed a hyper-element of O, first note that the commutative
square (7.2) gives
δ(j(S)V )V ′ = δ(PˆSV )V ′ = α
−1
V ′
(
Σ(iV ′V )(SV )
)
(7.9)
However, since S is a sub-object of Σ, we have Σ(iV ′V )(SV ) ⊆ SV ′ , and so,
from (7.9), for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
δ(j(S)V )V ′  α
−1
V ′ (SV ′) = PˆSV ′ = j(S)V ′ (7.10)
Thus the association V 7→ j(S)V does indeed define a hyper-element of O.
It is straightforward to show that the maps k : Hyp(O) → Subcl(Σ) and
j : Subcl(Σ)→ Hyp(O) are inverses of each. Thus the theorem is proved.
Proposition 7.2 There is a bijective correspondence
c : Sub(O)→ Hyp(O) (7.11)
defined by
c(A)V :=
∨
{αˆ | αˆ ∈ AV } (7.12)
for all sub-objects A of O.
Proof. The first step is to show that the right hand side of (7.12) is a
hyper-element of O. To this end we note that, for any V ′ ⊆ V ,
δ(c(AV ))V ′ = δ
(∨
{αˆ ∈ AV }
)
V ′
=
∨
{δ(αˆ)V ′ | αˆ ∈ AV } (7.13)
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where we have used the fact that daseinisation commutes with the logical
∨-operation. It is then clear that, since {δ(αˆ)V ′ | αˆ ∈ AV } ⊆ {βˆ | βˆ ∈ AV ′},
δ(c(AV ))V ′ =
∨
{δ(αˆ)V ′ | αˆ ∈ AV } 
∨
{βˆ | βˆ ∈ AV ′} = c(A)V ′ (7.14)
Therefore, the function V 7→ c(A)V defines a hyper-element of O, as required.
Conversely, define a function d : Hyp(O)→ Sub(O) by
d(γ)V := {αˆ ∈ P(V ) | αˆ  γˆV } (7.15)
for all V ∈ V(H). To show that the right hand side of (7.15) is a sub-object
of the outer presheaf, O, we first note that, for all V ′ ⊆ V ,
O(iV ′V )
(
d(γ)V
)
= δ
(
{αˆ ∈ P(V ) | αˆ  γˆV }
)
V ′
= {δ(αˆ)V ′ | αˆ  γˆV } (7.16)
Now, if αˆ  γˆV in P(V ) then δ(αˆ)V ′  δ(γˆV )V ′ in P(V
′) and, because γ is a
hyper-element, δ(γˆV )V ′  γˆV ′ . Therefore,
O(iV ′V )
(
d(γ)V
)
= {δ(αˆ)V ′ | αˆ  γˆV }
⊆ {δ(αˆ)V ′ | δ(αˆ)V ′  δ(γˆV )V ′}
⊆ {δ(αˆ)V ′ | δ(αˆ)V ′  γˆV ′}
⊆ {βˆ ∈ P(V ′) | βˆ  γˆV ′} = d(γ)V ′ (7.17)
Thus d(γ) is a sub-object of O, as claimed. It is easy to check that c :
Sub(O)→ Hyp(O) and d : Hyp(O)→ Sub(O) are inverses.
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